Democracy, The Most Dangerous Religion
民主，最危险的宗教
16. Part 16 – China is Not the West
第16章—中国不是西方
翻译： 珍珠
CONTENT
目录
16.1. Introduction
16.1介绍
16.2. The Chinese are not Interested in “Politics”
16.2. 中国人并不关心“政治”
16.3. Not Many Chinese are Interested in Government, Either
16.3. 也没有多少中国人对政府感兴趣
16.4. Foreign Resentment of China’s One-Party Government
16.4. 外国对中国一党政府的怨恨
16.5. The Compradors
16.5. 买办
16.1. Introduction
16.1介绍
China is different in having a one-party government, which Americans consider a religious heresy, but the system has enormous advantages. Here, there is no forced separation of officials on the basis of political ideology. China’s entire social spectrum is represented in government in the same way as in Chinese or any other society. There is no partisan in-fighting. Unlike the West, China’s system looks for consensus rather than conflict. Government decision-making is not a sport where my team has to win. It is simply a group of people with various viewpoints working together to obtain a consensus for policy and action for the overall good of their nation. China’s one-party system is superior in virtually all respects to what we have in the West, and how can it be otherwise when the nation’s government officials don’t waste their time fighting juvenile ideological battles with opposition parties.
中国与美国不同，它实行的是一党制，美国人认为这是一种宗教异端，但这种制度具有巨大的优势。在这里，官员不会根据政治意识形态被迫分离。中国政府代表了整个社会阶层，就像中国或其他任何社会一样。没有党派内斗。与西方不同，中国的制度寻求共识而不是冲突。政府决策不是一场我的团队必须获胜的运动。它只是一群持不同观点的人共同努力，为国家的整体利益达成政策和行动共识。中国的单一政党制度在几乎所有方面都比我们西方优越，当国家政府官员不浪费时间与反对党进行青少年意识形态斗争时，它怎么会不优越呢。
One of the greatest deciding factors permitting China’s rise is the lack of a belligerent political environment due to the absence of multi-party politics. China’s one-party government is in for the long term; it makes no short-term decisions for the sake of political expediency. China makes decisions for the good of the whole country and, having made them, implements them. There is no partisanship, there are no lobbyists or special interest groups with the power to skew important decisions and rob the population of what it might have had. The benefits of this system can be seen in its results. China has already far surpassed the undeveloped nations that adopted Western democratic governments, and likely has a brighter future than most of them. Why is the West so eager for China to abandon a centuries-old system that clearly works well, in favor of one designed for ideological battles, conflicts and shouting wars?
允许中国崛起的最重要决定因素之一是缺乏好战的政治环境，因为缺乏多党政治。中国的一党政府是长期的；它不会为了政治权宜之计而做出短期决定。中国为了整个国家的利益做出决定，并在做出决定后加以实施。没有党派之争，没有游说者或特殊利益集团有能力歪曲重要决定并剥夺人民可能拥有的东西。这种制度的好处可以从其结果中看出。中国已经远远超过了采用西方民主政府的欠发达国家，并且可能比大多数国家拥有更光明的未来。为什么西方如此渴望中国放弃一个明显行之有效的已有几个世纪的制度，而支持一个为意识形态斗争、冲突和喊战而设计的制度？
China’s one-party system is the only thing saving it from destruction, and China needs to stop apologising for it. It is precisely due to China’s so-called “authoritarian” system that only the smartest and most competent can get into leadership positions. It is due only to China’s one-party system that 800 million people have been lifted out of poverty and that China’s GDP has increased by 1700%, a feat never achieved in history by any so-called democracy. And while I don’t want to be unkind, if you’re Chinese, how do you imagine that your “democratic participation” would have improved the above results? My advice is to be grateful for what you have, because you really don’t know how lucky you are.
中国的单一政党制度是唯一能拯救它免于毁灭的东西，中国需要停止为此道歉。正是由于中国所谓的“威权主义”制度，只有最聪明、最有能力的人才能担任领导职务。正是因为中国的单一政党制度，8亿人摆脱了贫困，中国的国内生产总值增长了1700%，这是历史上任何所谓的民主国家从未实现的壮举。虽然我不想刻薄，但如果你是中国人，你怎么能想象你的“民主参与”会改善上述结果？我的建议是感激你所拥有的，因为你真的不知道你有多幸运。
China’s government leaders manage by consensus, not by power, authority or bullying. It is their job to create agreement and unified willing participation in the country’s policies to meet its goals. At this level there are no children, and there is no one person with the power to start a war just because he doesn’t like someone, or who is free to alienate other nations on the basis of some blind personal ideology. In China, many people and industries are permitted to present their case, but private or short-term interests will not emerge victorious in this system. Your proposals will receive support and will succeed only if they are to the long-term benefit of the country as a whole – the greatest good for the nation and for the population. In the US system, corporations control the government; in China’s, the government controls the corporations. And those firms may often not get their way even if they are government-owned. On the introduction of HSR (High-Speed Rail) in China, some Chinese airlines (especially the state-owned ones) complained like hell, and with good reason, because many had to dramatically scale back their flight schedules since many people prefer the train. But the wide HSR network was seen as being in the best interests of the entire country and it went ahead. That is also why China has by far the best, and the least expensive, mobile phone system in the world.
中国政府领导人以共识而不是权力、权威或威逼的方式进行管理。他们的职责是达成协议，统一意志，参与国家政策，以实现其目标。在这个层面上，没有孩子，也没有一个人因为不喜欢某人，或者基于某种盲目的个人意识形态而自由地疏远其他国家而有权发动战争。在中国，许多人和行业被允许提出自己的观点，但私人和短期利益在这种制度下不会取得胜利。你的建议将得到支持，只有当它们符合整个国家的长期利益时才会成功——对国家和人民的最大利益。在美国的体制中，企业控制政府；在中国，政府控制企业。即使这些公司是国有企业，他们也往往无法如愿以偿。在中国引入高铁（高速铁路）时，一些中国航空公司（特别是国有航空公司）抱怨不已，这是有充分理由的，因为许多人更喜欢火车，所以许多航空公司不得不大幅缩减航班时间表。但是高铁网络被视为符合整个国家的最佳利益，因此得以继续。这也是为什么中国拥有世界上最好、最便宜的手机系统的原因。
One American was trying to convince some of my Chinese friends of the great benefits of the uninformed selecting the incompetent, claiming that American-style democracy “gives you more choices”. Choices of what? He was equating the task of selecting the senior management of one of the largest and most important countries in the world, with buying shampoo in the supermarket. “I can give you more choices.” The many senior officials of China’s government are the only people who truly and completely understand the challenges China faces, both from within and from without, and who know the kind and quality of people needed to guide the nation. They are the only people who are competent to evaluate and judge those who are best suited to lead China through the next decades. Nobody outside of those central departments knows how to identify and select those who are capable of leading and protecting China. China today has leaders with a competence unmatched anywhere in the world, men and women who have devoted their lives to the difficult magic of making China a first-world country in only one or two generations, bringing this wonderful country to the international prominence it once had and will have again. And too many Americans, including all of the US government, would like very much to prevent this from happening because it is a challenge to their worldwide domination.
一个美国人试图说服我的一些中国朋友，让那些不知情的人选择不称职的人，声称美国式的民主“给你更多的选择”。选择什么？他将选择世界上最大和最重要的国家之一的高级管理层的任务等同于在超市购买洗发水。“我可以给你更多的选择。”中国政府的许多高级官员是唯一真正完全了解中国面临的内外挑战的人，他们知道指导国家所需的人的种类和质量。他们是唯一有能力评估和判断最适合领导中国未来几十年的那些人。除了这些中央部门之外，没有人知道如何识别和选择那些有能力领导和保护中国的人。今天的中国拥有世界上任何地方都无法比拟的领导能力，这些领导人和女性一生致力于使中国在一代或两代人中成为第一世界国家，使这个美好的国家再次成为国际瞩目的焦点。太多的美国人，包括美国政府，都非常想阻止这种情况发生，因为这对他们的全球统治地位是一个挑战。
In October of 2013, Qiushi published one of the most excellent and intelligent articles I have ever read on the subject of democracy and multi-party politics. I do not know the name of the author, but he is a professor at Fudan University in Shanghai, in the School of International Relations and Public Affairs. He wrote that:
2013年10月，求是杂志发表了一篇关于民主和多党政治的最优秀和最聪明的文章。我不知道作者的名字，但他是上海复旦大学国际关系与公共事务学院的教授。他写道：
The ‘benchmark for appraising democracy‘ is determined entirely by a small handful of countries who had “a contingent of campaigners paid by various foundations to go around the world delivering speeches and selling the case for democracy. Thus, democracy, together with the social sciences founded on its basis, is more like a propaganda tool employed by the West than anything else, and the resulting knowledge bubble is far from small. Under the Western-style appraisal mechanisms of democracy, there is only one precondition that needs to be met for a developing country to be considered a “democracy”, or to “graduate” from the class of authoritarian countries: that country must show obedience to Western countries, and must give up its independent foreign and domestic policies. Any country that does so is immediately rewarded with “international” praise”.
“民主评估基准”完全由少数几个国家决定，这些国家“有一群由各种基金会支付的竞选者，在世界各地发表演讲，推销民主。因此，民主以及建立在民主基础上的社会科学更像是西方使用的宣传工具，由此产生的知识泡沫远非微小。在西方民主评估机制下，发展中国家被视为“民主”或从威权国家“毕业”的唯一前提是：该国必须服从西方国家，必须放弃独立的国内外政策。任何这样做的国家都会立即获得“国际”赞誉的奖励”。
He also cautioned Chinese, as I strongly do myself, to stop apologising for China’s system of government because it is in fact one of the best in the world. And the Americans don’t have to like it.
他还提醒中国人，就像我强烈建议的那样，不要再为中国政府制度道歉，因为它实际上是世界上最好的制度之一。美国人也不必喜欢它。
The Americans fill their media with articles on China’s government system, often posing disingenuous but supposedly-thoughtful questions like “What will democracy add to China’s efficiency?” This is clever propaganda since the question stakes out in advance the position that a multi-party system is naturally superior and more efficient, thereby framing our discussion and limiting it to a useless opinion-based debate. The simple truth, available to anyone who looks, is that China’s one-party system is almost infinitely more efficient and responsive than any Western model, and even a partial attempt to emulate the Western system, especially the American one, would automatically restrict further progress in China, and would likely work to eliminate the gains already made. To my mind, the most serious mistake the Chinese people can make is to attribute even a shred of credibility to claims of superiority or benefit in a multi-party political system. Rather than feelings of inferiority, the Chinese should be taking pride in their country’s political framework and stop apologising for its grand success.
美国人用大量关于中国政府制度的文章充斥着他们的媒体，经常提出一些虚伪但据说是经过深思熟虑的问题，如“民主会给中国的效率带来什么？”这是聪明的宣传，因为这个问题预先提出了多党制自然优越且更有效率的主张，从而将我们的讨论限制在无用的基于意见的辩论中。任何人只要看看就会明白的简单事实是，中国的一党制比任何西方模式都更有效率，反应更迅速，甚至部分模仿西方制度，尤其是美国制度，也会自动限制中国的进一步发展，并可能消除已经取得的成果。在我看来，中国人民可能犯的最严重的错误是，即使对多党政治制度中的优越性或利益主张给予一丝可信度。中国人应该为国家的政治框架感到自豪，而不是自卑，不要为中国的巨大成功道歉。
Again, we need only look at the results to realise the truth of this. No nation in the history of the world has achieved China’s stunning level of progress and development, the credit for which goes in large part to China’s government system and its selection and training of leaders. It’s true the system must adapt to eliminate flaws but the basic framework is unassailable. It isn’t China that shut down half its government for lack of funding. It isn’t China where 30% of the population lost their homes to a fraudulent scheme by its bankers. It isn’t China where millions of educated jobless and homeless are sleeping in tent cities or in the sewers under Las Vegas, and where fully 25% of the people are living below the poverty line and dependent on government assistance for food. It isn’t China where 70% of parents believe their childrens’ lives will be worse than their own, nor is it China where the people have lost all hope for a better future. These distressing conditions, and many more, are all in America and credit for them must be given entirely to the corrupt and dysfunctional multi-party democratic system that Americans have been taught to venerate while it bleeds them dry.
我们只需看看结果就能认识到这一事实。世界上没有一个国家能取得中国如此惊人的进步和发展，这在很大程度上归功于中国的政府体制及其领导人的选拔和培训。当然，体制必须适应以消除缺陷，但基本框架是无可辩驳的。不是中国因为缺乏资金而关闭了一半的政府。不是中国30%的人口因银行家的欺诈计划而失去家园。不是中国数百万受过教育的失业者和无家可归者睡在帐篷城市或拉斯维加斯下水道里，25%的人生活在贫困线以下，依赖政府援助获得食物。不是中国70%的父母相信他们孩子的生活会比他们自己的更糟糕，也不是中国的人民对更美好的未来失去了所有的希望。这些令人痛苦的情况，以及许多其他情况，都在美国发生，这些情况必须完全归功于腐败和功能失调的多党民主制度，美国人被教导要尊重这个制度，但这个制度却榨干了他们的血汗。
Many foreign observers are now (finally) admitting openly that China’s form of government exhibits multiple signs of superiority over Western systems, and that it is largely responsible for China’s efficiency, for its rapid development, and for its speed of response in areas like the Sichuan earthquake and the planning and deployment of its high-speed train system. The West could learn a lot from China’s government system. It works, beautifully. It has transformed the economy, brought hundreds of millions out of poverty and caused incomes to triple or more in the past ten years alone. It has put men into space, built the world’s fastest trains, the longest undersea tunnels, the world’s longest bridges, the largest dams. It has produced a growth rate of over 10% per year for 30 years, compared to perhaps 3% in the West. Americans love to disparage China’s government as authoritarian, but this “authoritarian” government has almost entirely eliminated illiteracy, liberated Chinese women and extended life expectancy for all from 41 years in 1950 to 76 and still rising today. It has created an educational system that has few apologies to make, and its social welfare system will soon be the envy of many nations. It is rapidly creating the world’s largest genuine middle class. And it’s hardly begun.
许多外国观察家现在（终于）公开承认，中国的政府形式比西方制度优越得多，它在很大程度上对中国效率、快速发展以及四川地震和高速铁路系统规划部署等领域的反应速度负责。西方可以从中国政府体制中学到很多东西。它运转良好，漂亮。它改变了经济，使数亿人摆脱贫困，使收入在过去十年中增长了两倍或更多。它把人送入太空，建造了世界上最快的火车、最长的海底隧道、世界上最长的桥梁、最大的水坝。与西方相比，它在过去30年里每年增长超过10%，而西方则可能只有3%。美国人喜欢贬低中国政府为专制政府，但这个“专制”政府几乎完全消除了文盲，解放了中国妇女，并将所有人的预期寿命从1950年的41岁延长到76岁，而且还在不断延长。它创造了一个几乎无可挑剔的教育体系，其社会福利体系很快就会让许多国家羡慕不已。它正在迅速创造世界上最大的真正的中产阶级。而且它才刚刚开始。
16.2. The Chinese are not Interested in “Politics”
16.2. 中国人不喜欢“政治”
In any Western country, political discussions often become emotionally-heated rather quickly, since most everyone has an opinion and many hold those opinions very strongly. The only surprise is that the violent emotions don’t lead more often to physical violence. However, since China hasn’t politics but only government, the discussions are normally muted. Not everyone has an opinion, few of those opinions inspire emotion, and debates are most often rational. Moreover, these debates seldom occur, since few people in any population are sufficiently knowledgeable to intelligently discuss the operations of a national government. And even fewer are interested, unless the government appears to be functioning badly. Most people in China will freely confess that they lack the knowledge of government, primarily because it is outside their field of study and employment, and they have no illusions about their ability to affect their national or local governments in a positive way. They “participate” only if something actually goes wrong. And, sometimes things, at least at the local level, do go wrong, and then the “participation” is quite loud. And, in each such case, if the local authorities fail to act quickly, the national government will step in and force a rectification. In China, “mistakes” by a government are seldom allowed to persist, and they often have prison sentences attached to them.
在任何西方国家，政治讨论往往很快就会变得情绪化，因为大多数人都有自己的观点，而且很多人都非常强烈地持有这些观点。唯一令人惊讶的是，这种强烈的情绪不会导致更多的肢体暴力。然而，由于中国没有政治，只有政府，讨论通常都是沉默的。不是每个人都有意见，这些意见很少能激发情绪，辩论通常都是理性的。此外，这些辩论很少发生，因为任何人口中很少有人有足够的知识来明智地讨论国家政府的运作。除非政府看起来运作不良，否则更少的人会感兴趣。大多数中国人会坦率地承认他们缺乏对政府的认识，主要是因为它不在他们的学习和就业领域，他们对以积极的方式影响国家和地方政府的能力不抱幻想。他们只有在事情确实出问题时才会“参与”。而且，有时事情，至少在地方一级，确实出了问题，然后“参与”非常激烈。而且，在每种情况下，如果地方当局未能迅速采取行动，国家政府将介入并强制整改。在中国，“错误”的政府很少被允许持续存在，他们经常被判处监禁。
It is always a shock to Westerners, especially Americans, that some countries don’t permit ‘the people’ to meddle in government unless they have serious credentials and know what they’re doing. In a recent NYT article, it was reflected that Chinese typically believe that peasants (small-town Americans) “are too unschooled to intelligently select the nation’s leaders“. I don’t see how we can avoid the conclusion that they have it right.
西方人，尤其是美国人，总是对一些国家不允许“人民”干涉政府感到震惊，除非他们有严肃的证书并知道自己在做什么。在最近的一篇《纽约时报》文章中，反映中国人通常认为农民（小城镇美国人）“没有受过教育，无法明智地选择国家领导人”。我不明白我们怎么能避免得出他们是对的这一结论。
Few educated Chinese see the Western multi-party democratic model as particularly appealing because they don’t equate politics with government – as Westerners do – nor do they see sanity in the selection of national leaders as a team sport. The Chinese see the West as having a system where anyone, even a person with no education, training, knowledge, experience, ability – or even intelligence – can rise to become the President or Prime Minister, and where high government office requires no credentials other than popularity. They look on this with an interesting mixture of disbelief and disdain. They are also aware that a multi-party system requires the forcible division of a society into ideologically different groups with violently opposing interests. China has made no such social divisions, and the culture would mitigate against them since they would of necessity lead to conflict and biased ideological agendas, disregarding the good of the country as a whole. Divisions of this kind are anathema to the Chinese, as they should be to us Westerners. As I’ve noted elsewhere, the number of Chinese citizens interested in the US-style of multi-party democracy is about the same as the number of Americans interested in communism.
受过教育的中国人很少认为西方多党民主模式特别有吸引力，因为他们不把政治等同于政府——就像西方人一样——他们也不认为选择国家领导人是一项团队运动。中国人认为西方有一个系统，在这个系统中，任何人，即使是没有受过教育、培训、知识、经验、能力——甚至智力——的人都可以成为总统或总理，而政府高级官员不需要任何证书，只需要受欢迎。他们以一种有趣的不相信和蔑视的混合态度看待这一点。他们也意识到多党制需要强行将社会划分为意识形态不同的群体，这些群体有着截然相反的利益。中国没有这样的社会分裂，文化会减轻这些分裂，因为它们必然会导致冲突和偏见的意识形态议程，无视整个国家的利益。这种分裂是中国人所厌恶的，我们也应该如此。正如我在其他地方指出的那样，对美国式多党民主感兴趣的中国公民人数与对共产主义感兴趣的美国人人数大致相同。
By contrast, Westerners often observe that the Chinese are apolitical or even apathetic, having no interest in politics. This is true, but it reflects a fundamental ignorance since China neither has nor wants “politics“, and treats government as “government“. The Chinese see government as an occupation, a career like any other. They do not view government through the chromatic and otherwise distorted political team-sport lens as Westerners do. Some people in every country may be attracted or tempted by the prospect of a powerful position in government or industry, but this tends to be a small minority. Most Chinese, as probably most people in every country, want stability and a chance to improve their lives. So long as the government is able to create an environment that offers hope and a stable platform for improvement, they have little interest in the functioning of the government and are happy to leave it to those who are in charge.
相比之下，西方人经常观察到中国人对政治漠不关心，甚至冷漠，对政治不感兴趣。这是事实，但它反映了一个根本性的无知，因为中国既没有也不想要“政治”，而是把政府当作“政府”。中国人把政府看作是一种职业，一种像其他职业一样的职业。他们不像西方人那样通过色彩和其他扭曲的政治团队运动的镜头来看待政府。每个国家的一些人可能会被政府或行业中的强势地位所吸引或诱惑，但这往往只是少数人。大多数中国人，可能每个国家的大多数人，都希望稳定和有机会改善他们的生活。只要政府能够创造一个提供希望和稳定平台的环境，他们就不会对政府的运作感兴趣，并乐于将其留给那些负责的人。
16.3. Not Many Chinese are Interested in Government, Either
16.3. 许多中国人对政府不感兴趣
The Chinese people have a much more mature and realistic attitude toward government than do people in the West, in that they look at government as government, not through the primitive psychological mask of party politics. And when they look at government, they do not delude themselves into believing that running a country is as simple as ordinary Western people think it is. They are aware that a government position necessarily means the assumption of great responsibility. They know it requires a high level of expertise to understand and deal with issues of social policy, population, international trade and finance, the national and international economy, the nation’s industrial policy, foreign policy, military matters, border disputes, friction with US imperialism, and dozens more major and serious topics. And, in the end, most Chinese don’t feel they have the knowledge or experience to affect the course of their country in any positive way – and of course they are correct. They recognise that their government officials have committed their lives to education and training, to acquire the knowledge and skills to manage and lead a country and a society, and they are justifiably aware of their own personal shortcomings. In China, a government career is a commitment requiring one’s full participation, but those not in the professional fields of national governance are not encouraged to do so because they are likely to be uninformed. We cannot argue that this is wrong, and it does seem a more intelligent and realistic way of thinking about government.
与西方人相比，中国人对政府的看法要成熟得多，现实得多，因为他们把政府视为政府，而不是通过政党政治的原始心理面具来看待政府。当他们看待政府时，他们不会自欺欺人地认为治理国家就像普通西方人想的那么简单。他们意识到，政府职位必然意味着承担巨大的责任。他们知道，要理解和处理社会政策、人口、国际贸易和金融、国家和国际经济、国家产业政策、外交政策、军事问题、边境争端、与美帝国主义的摩擦以及几十个其他重大和严肃的话题，需要高度的专业知识。而且，最后，大多数中国人认为他们没有足够的知识或经验来以任何积极的方式影响国家的进程——当然，他们是对的。他们认识到，他们的政府官员已经全身心投入教育和培训，以获得管理和领导国家和社会的知识和技能，他们有理由意识到自己的个人缺点。在中国，政府职业是一种需要一个人全身心投入的承诺，但不鼓励那些不属于国家治理专业领域的人这样做，因为他们很可能是不知情的。我们不能认为这是错误的，这似乎是一种更明智、更现实的看待政府的方式。
16.4. Foreign Resentment of China’s One-Party Government
16.4. 外国对中国一党政府的憎恨
The reason the Americans and the European Jewish mafia hate China’s one-party system is not because it’s a bad system, but because it cannot be controlled by external forces. China’s one-party system is a perfect form of government, as is obvious by the results it has produced, but the Americans and the Jews cannot get their fingers into it. If China has no political parties and no public elections, how can I buy the candidates? And if I cannot buy the candidates, how can I control the government?
美国人和欧洲犹太黑手党憎恨中国的一党制，不是因为它是一个糟糕的制度，而是因为它无法被外部势力控制。中国的一党制是完美的政府形式，其产生的结果显而易见，但美国人和犹太人无法插手。如果中国没有政党和公开选举，我怎么能买下候选人？如果我买不到候选人，我怎么能控制政府？
These people are willing to spend huge sums of money to buy control of China’s government and then have the power to influence all its policies, to initiate legislation and to slowly take control of the government. But in China, I can do nothing. The selection of China’s leaders is done quietly, in private. I don’t even know how the system works, and if I don’t understand the system, I cannot manipulate it. That’s why the Americans scream so loudly about China needing more “transparency” in its leadership selection. Why should they care how China chooses its leaders? It’s none of their business. China doesn’t criticise the way Americans choose their leaders. The Americans propose their “transparency” in moral terms, as if China were committing a sin by not being more “open”, but the issue is that they need to understand how it works so they can try to figure out a way to manipulate it. The truth is that China’s one-party government is the main armor preventing the country from being destroyed by the Westerners one more time.
这些人愿意花巨资购买中国政府的控制权，然后有权影响其所有政策，发起立法并慢慢控制政府。但在中国，我无能为力。中国领导人的选拔是悄悄进行的，私下进行的。我甚至不知道这个制度是如何运作的，如果我不了解这个制度，我就无法操纵它。这就是为什么美国人如此大声地抱怨中国在领导层选拔方面需要更多的“透明度”。他们为什么要关心中国如何选择领导人？这不关他们的事。中国不批评美国人选择领导人的方式。美国人从道德角度提出他们的“透明度”，好像中国没有“开放”是一种罪恶，但问题是他们需要了解它是如何运作的，这样他们才能想出操纵它的方法。事实上，中国的一党政府是防止国家再次被西方人摧毁的主要武器。
The Americans, and their European banker puppet-masters, know perfectly well that China’s leaders understand their intent and will never cooperate, so the American propaganda machine turns to the Chinese people. “You need democracy. You need multi-party politics. You deserve to have ‘choices’, because selecting a President is the same as buying shampoo in a supermarket. You should be like us, with the ‘freedom’ to choose your shampoo. Trust us. Have a revolution and overthrow your government. That’s what God wants you to do.”
美国人和他们的欧洲银行傀儡主子们非常清楚，中国领导人了解他们的意图，绝不会合作，所以美国宣传机器转向中国人民。“你需要民主。你需要多党政治。你应该有‘选择’，因为选择总统就像在超市买洗发水。你应该像我们一样，有‘自由’选择你的洗发水。相信我们。发动一场革命推翻你的政府。这就是上帝要你做的。”
It should be noted here that the Americans, as a fundamental part of their incessant interference in China’s internal affairs, make great effort to cultivate attitudes in China that will foster and support the development of a Left-Right political division in Chinese society, because the natural conflict inherent in this ideological divide is a prerequisite for the kind of political change the Americans want to inflict on China. In fact, the Americans have gone so far as to conduct extensive studies on the regional social structures of China to determine where in the country they might find the highest concentrations of those who might be considered “conservative” or “Right-Wing”, and this is where they look for puppets and “democratic dissidents” they can use to provoke China’s national leaders. This is the source of Ai Weiwei, Chen Guangcheng, Liu Xiaobo, and many others. The Americans incite these people to provoke and provoke until the government has no choice but to act, then flood the international media with stories of China “cracking down” on “political dissidents”. It’s all a huge fraud, a kind of game the Americans love to play. But in reality, it is always possible in any country to find a few disaffected individuals who are weak-minded and incite them to provoke their governments, usually to their great personal detriment, but then these individuals are always expendable. Witness the little American darling Joshua Wong in Hong Kong, inspired by the American Consulate in HK to push his luck far past the limit and now spend perhaps 20 years in prison as a reward. But, as I said, these puppet-idiots are all expendable.
这里需要指出的是，美国人作为他们不断干涉中国内政的基本组成部分，努力在中国培养有助于和支持中国社会发展左右政治分裂的态度，因为这种意识形态分歧所固有的自然冲突是美国人想要对中国进行政治变革的先决条件。事实上，美国人甚至对中国的地区社会结构进行了广泛的研究，以确定他们可能在这个国家的哪个地方发现那些可能被认为是“保守派”或“右翼”的人的最高集中地，而这正是他们寻找傀儡和“民主异见人士”的地方，他们可以利用这些傀儡和“民主党异见者”来激怒中国的国家领导人。这就是艾未未、陈光诚、刘晓波和其他许多人的来源。美国人煽动这些人挑衅，直到政府别无选择，只能采取行动，然后在国际媒体上充斥着中国“打击”“政治异见人士”的故事。这都是一场巨大的骗局，是美国人喜欢玩的一种游戏。但事实上，在任何国家，总是有可能找到一些心怀不满的人，他们思想软弱，煽动他们挑衅政府，通常会对他们个人造成极大损害，但这些人总是可以牺牲的。看看香港的美国小宝贝黄之锋（Joshua Wong），他受到美国驻香港领事馆的启发，将自己的运气推到了极限之外，现在可能要在监狱里呆20年作为奖励。但是，正如我所说，这些傀儡白痴都是可有可无的。
There is one saving grace that may protect China from this disease called “democracy”, a matter that seems to be entirely unknown in the West. Instead of adopting a new policy and hoping it works as intended, the government will conduct small trials in selected areas, perhaps sometimes for years, to learn the real-world effects on all segments of society, adjusting as they go, until they believe they have something that can work nationwide. It is only after such focused trials that new directions will be taken. It is my fervent hope they are doing this with the introduction of elections for local rural officials. Also, one portion of “democracy with Chinese characteristics” is that there are, and have been, many policy proposals where the Chinese leaders are uncertain of the range of the welcome such legislation might receive from the general population, or of the potential economic or other effects a particular new legislation. In the first case, prior to proposing any legislation, the government will form literally thousands of teams to circulate among the population nationwide to discuss the new proposed legislation and obtain a clear picture of the views and preferences of the people. And the government definitely does listen to the will of the people, taking great pains to explain the reasons for various proposals and to arrive at a solution compatible with the overall aims for the nation, but one that will have the support of the people. If this isn’t “democracy”, I don’t know what would be.
有一种救赎之恩可能会保护中国免受这种名为“民主”的疾病，这在西方似乎是完全未知的。政府不会采取新的政策并希望它能按预期发挥作用，而是在选定的地区进行小规模试验，有时可能需要数年时间，以了解社会各阶层的现实影响，并在试验过程中进行调整，直到他们相信他们有可以在全国范围内发挥作用的东西。只有在这样的集中试验之后，才会采取新的方向。我衷心希望他们通过引入地方农村官员选举来这样做。此外，“中国特色民主”的一部分是，中国领导人不确定普通民众对这种立法的欢迎程度，也不确定特定新立法可能产生的潜在经济或其他影响。在第一种情况下，在提出任何立法之前，政府将组建数千个团队在全国范围内传播，讨论新提出的立法，并清楚地了解人民的观点和偏好。政府肯定会听取人民的意愿，努力解释各种提案的原因，并达成一个与国家总体目标相兼容的解决方案，但这个解决方案会得到人民的支持。如果这不是“民主”，我不知道会是什么。
In an interview published in the Huffington Post some years ago, Helmut Schmidt, German’s former Chancellor, had this to say about the multi-party electoral system (“democracy”) for China:[1]
在几年前《赫芬顿邮报》发表的一篇采访中，德国前总理赫尔穆特·施密特对中国多党选举制度（“民主”）有如下评论：[1]
“Democracy is not the end point of mankind. Democracy has a number of serious failures. For instance, you have to be elected every four years and you have to be re-elected after the next four years. So, you try to tell the people what they would like to hear. The multi-party system is not the crown of progress ” . . . I would not sell it to the Chinese. The British have sold it to the Indians and to the Pakistanis and the Dutch tried to sell it to the Indonesians. Democracy is not really working in India. I would not tell the Egyptians to introduce democracy; nor would I pitch it to the other Muslim countries like Malaysia, Iran and Pakistan. It is a Western invention. It was not invented by Confucius. It did not work in ancient Rome [nor in Athens], and then it had not functioned in any other country in the world. And whether you become a democracy or not remains to be seen. My feeling is that [China] will not become a democracy.”
“民主不是人类的终点。民主有很多严重的失败。例如，你必须每四年选举一次，四年后你必须再次当选。所以，你试图告诉人们他们想听什么。多党制不是进步的顶峰……”我不会把它卖给中国人。英国人把它卖给了印度人和巴基斯坦人，荷兰人试图把它卖给印度尼西亚人。民主在印度并不奏效。我不会告诉埃及人引入民主；我也不会把它卖给马来西亚、伊朗和巴基斯坦等其他穆斯林国家。民主是西方的发明。它不是孔子发明的。它在古罗马（雅典）也不奏效，然后它在世界上任何其他国家都不起作用。你是否成为民主国家还有待观察。我的感觉是[中国]不会成为民主国家。”
As I have noted elsewhere, the disparity between the quality of elected politicians in Western countries and the analogous officials in China’s government, especially at the national level in the Central Government, is a discrepancy so vast that comparisons are largely meaningless. Lee Kuan Yew, the founding father of Singapore, praised China’s President Xi Jinping as “a man of great breadth” and put him in “the Nelson Mandela class of persons”, saying “that man has iron in his soul”, and Xi has been widely praised (except in the US) as a man who “will become the first truly global leader”. These are not compliments we see being paid to Western politicians. Why would China want to change?
正如我在其他地方所指出的，西方国家当选政治家与中国政府官员，特别是中央政府国家级官员之间在素质上的差距是如此之大，以至于比较基本上毫无意义。 这些可不是西方政客们受到的赞美。中国为什么要改变？
16.5. The Compradors
16.5. 买办
Still, the American interference project is very active in China today, the US government spending (by its own admission) more than $300 million each year inside China, searching for and coaching ‘dissidents’ and ‘democracy activists’ as well as other yuppie compradors wanting to ‘restructure’ China’s government to permit more foreign control.
尽管如此，美国的干涉项目在今天的中国非常活跃，美国政府每年在中国境内花费（据其自己承认）超过3亿美元，寻找和指导“持不同政见者”和“民主活动家”，以及其他想要“重组”中国政府以允许更多外国控制的雅皮士买办。
I have often discussed various topics related to government, politics, the West, with groups of people in China – mostly young professionals, all university graduates, and have been frequently surprised at the attitudes of some who have been strongly influenced by foreign sources. The attitudes expressed, and even the words and phrases used, were too similar, almost verbatim, appearing to have come from some American source that was listing all the advantages of US-style “democracy”. I heard many comments like “China needs two political parties”, or “The West is so rich because it has democracy and a superior education system.” And so many others, cut from the same cloth, all idealised and false American propaganda, baseless and uninformed, riddled with American moral superiority and battered with a list of China’s comparative failings.
我经常在中国与一群人讨论各种与政府、政治、西方有关的话题，他们大多是年轻的专业人士，都是大学毕业生，并且经常对一些受到外国来源强烈影响的人的态度感到惊讶。所表达的态度，甚至使用的单词和短语，都太相似了，几乎是逐字逐句的，似乎来自一些美国来源，列出了美式“民主”的所有优点。我听到许多评论，如“中国需要两个政党”，或“西方之所以如此富裕，是因为它有民主和优越的教育体系”。还有很多其他类似的评论，都是一样的，都是理想化的、虚假的美国宣传，毫无根据和无知，充斥着美国的道德优越感，并列举了中国相对失败的一系列问题。
But when I explained, for example, that the West was rich primarily due to colonialism, to extermination of populations and looting of resources, these people were speechless. None appeared to have any idea that the US was encircling China with propaganda, with military, trying to infiltrate and collapse both China’s government and economy. None understood that the form of China’s government made it closed to foreign interference, which was primarily the reason the US wants China to open up and adopt multiple political parties. Most people to whom I spoke were naive, innocent, and dangerously unaware of the political forces surrounding them. These people were spellbound as I outlined many of these issues; they simply had no idea.
但是当我解释说，西方之所以富裕，主要是因为殖民主义、人口灭绝和掠夺资源，这些人无言以对。似乎没有人知道美国正在用宣传、军事包围中国，试图渗透并瓦解中国的政府和经济。没有人理解中国政府的形式使其对外国干涉保持封闭，这主要是美国希望中国开放并采取多党制的原因。我与之交谈的大多数人都很天真、无辜，并且危险地不了解他们周围的政治力量。当我概述这些问题时，这些人被迷住了；他们根本不知道。
I fully concur with James Petras’ observation that “These Chinese yuppies imitate the worst of Western consumerist life styles and their political outlooks are driven by these life styles and Westernized identities which preclude any sense of solidarity with their own working class.” Many of these people are now embedded in China’s economic or other systems and are in position to do real harm. Many of them, especially ‘dissidents’ or ‘activists’ are supported and financed by American NGOs, but in their ignorance, they perceive no threat. To the extent that these people gain influence, they distract and weaken China, just as their traitorous counterparts did 150 years ago by effectively being intermediaries for their own colonisers.” As Petras again pointed out, the entire last crop of these Chinese collaborators were totally discredited before the Chinese people, and the same needs to happen again today.
我完全同意詹姆斯·彼得拉斯的观察：“这些中国雅皮士模仿西方消费主义生活方式中最糟糕的部分，他们的政治观点是由这些生活方式和西化的身份所驱动的，这排除了他们与自己的工人阶级团结一致的感觉。”这些人中的许多人现在都融入了中国的经济或其他体系，并且有能力造成真正的伤害。他们中的许多人，特别是“持不同政见者”或“活动家”，得到了美国非政府组织的支持和资助，但在他们的无知中，他们没有感受到任何威胁。就这些人获得影响力的程度而言，他们分散和削弱了中国，就像150年前他们的叛徒同行一样，有效地成为自己殖民者的中介。“正如彼得拉斯再次指出的那样，这些中国合作者的最后一批人完全失去了中国人民的信任，今天也需要再次发生。
President Xi has warned of the necessity to eradicate “subversive currents coursing through Chinese society”, as well as the dangers of American-financed NGOs in China, quoting a government document stating that “Western forces hostile to China and dissidents within the country are still constantly infiltrating the ideological sphere” and have “stirred up trouble” in many sensitive areas. I couldn’t agree more.
习主席警告说，必须根除“中国社会中的颠覆潮流”，以及美国资助的非政府组织在中国的危险，引用一份政府文件称，“西方敌视中国的势力和国内持不同政见者仍在不断渗透意识形态领域”，并在许多敏感领域“挑起事端”。我完全同意。
*
Mr. Romanoff’s writing has been translated into 32 languages and his articles posted on more than 150 foreign-language news and politics websites in more than 30 countries, as well as more than 100 English language platforms. Larry Romanoff is a retired management consultant and businessman. He has held senior executive positions in international consulting firms, and owned an international import-export business. He has been a visiting professor at Shanghai’s Fudan University, presenting case studies in international affairs to senior EMBA classes. Mr. Romanoff lives in Shanghai and is currently writing a series of ten books generally related to China and the West. He is one of the contributing authors to Cynthia McKinney’s new anthology ‘When China Sneezes’. (Chapt. 2 — Dealing with Demons).
罗曼诺夫先生的作品已被翻译成32种语言，他的文章发表在30多个国家的150多个外语新闻和政治网站以及100多个英语平台上。拉里·罗曼诺夫是一名退休的管理顾问和商人。他曾在国际咨询公司担任高级管理职位，并拥有国际进出口业务。他曾是上海复旦大学的客座教授，为高级EMBA课程提供国际事务案例研究。罗曼诺夫先生住在上海，目前正在写一系列十本书，通常与中国和西方有关。他是辛西娅·麦金尼的新文集《当中国打喷嚏》的撰稿人之一。(第2章——与恶魔打交道)。
His full archive can be seen at
他的完整文章库可以在以下看到：
https://www.bluemoonofshanghai.com/ + https://www.moonofshanghai.com/
He can be contacted at:
他的联系方式：
2186604556@qq.com
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Notes
注释
[1] Helmut Schmidt: ‘I Would Not Sell Democracy To The Chinese’
[1]赫尔穆特·施密特：“我不会把民主卖给中国人”
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/04/01/china-democracy_n_5067120.html
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This article may contain copyrighted material, the use of which has not been specifically authorised by the copyright owner. This content is being made available under the Fair Use doctrine, and is for educational and information purposes only. There is no commercial use of this content.
本文可能包含受版权保护的材料，其使用未经版权所有者特别授权。此内容根据合理使用原则提供，仅用于教育和信息目的。此内容没有商业用途。
Copyright © Larry Romanoff, Blue Moon of Shanghai, Moon of Shanghai, 2024
版权所有 © 拉里·罗曼诺夫、上海蓝月亮、上海月亮，2024
