- 第1章—— 引言 — Chapter 1 — Introduction
- 第2章——美国国内项目和实验 — Chapter 2 — US Domestic Projects and Experiments
- 第3章——美国可疑疫情 — Chapter 3 — US Suspicious Outbreaks
- 第4章——美国海外部署 — Chapter 4 — US Foreign Deployment
- 第5章-世界卫生组织-人口减少是现实 — Chapter 5 — The WHO – Depopulation is Reality
- 第6章——辉瑞公司对流行病把握的恰到好处 — Chapter 6 — Pfizer’s Perfectly-Timed Epidemic
- 第7章——美国禽流感 — Chapter 7 — US Bird flu
- 第8章——英国口蹄疫 — Chapter 8 — UK Foot and Mouth Disease
- 第9章——意大利的橄榄树 — Chapter 9 — Italy’s Olive Trees
- 第10章——最近的生物武器袭击 — Chapter 10 – Recent Bio-Weapons Attacks
- 第11章——艾滋病 — Chapter 11 – AIDS
- 第12章——非典型肺炎 — Chapter 12 – SARS
- 第13章——中东呼吸综合征 — Chapter 13 – MERS
- 第14章——埃博拉病毒 — Chapter 14 – EBOLA
- 第15 寨——卡病毒 — Chapter 15 – ZIKA
- 第16章——新冠肺炎疫苗和Oxitec的“飞行注射器” — Chapter 16 – COVID Vaccinations and Oxitec’s “Flying Syringes”
- 第17章——尾声 — Chapter 17 – Epilogue
生物战在行动 — Biological Warfare in Action
第13章——中东呼吸综合征 — Chapter 13 – MERS
作者：拉里·罗曼诺夫
译者：珍珠
Au unidentified student is checked her temperature as a precaution against MERS (Middle East Respiratory Syndrome) at Gwanghui Elementary School in Seoul, South Korea, Wednesday, June 17, 2015. The death toll in South Korea’s MERS outbreak increased Tuesday even as schools reopened and people recovered from the virus. (AP Photo/Ahn Young-joon). Source
2015年6月17日，星期三，韩国首尔，光惠小学，一名身份不明的Au学生正在检查体温，以预防中东呼吸综合征。尽管学校重新开放，人们从病毒中康复，但韩国MERS疫情的死亡人数周二仍在增加。（美联社照片/安英俊）。来源
In late 2012, the world experienced the onset of a new mini-epidemic from a novel coronavirus that was named MERS (1) (2) because it supposedly originated in the Middle East, at first infecting small numbers of people in Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Qatar. Then England experienced a few cases where individuals apparently became infected during trips to the Middle East.This new virus was similar to SARS but was accused of having mutated and developed an ability to invade human cells more efficiently and therefore kill about 50% of those infected, compared to only about 10% for SARS. The virus was first seen by an Egyptian virologist in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia while doing tests on a patient with unusual symptoms, with the discovery soon after that this ‘patient zero’ and the Qatari man in the UK had been infected by viruses that were 99.5% identical. (3) There was no vaccine or treatment for the disease, and its fatality rate reached over 40% overall.
2012年末，世界经历了一种新的由新型冠状病毒引起的小型流行病的爆发，该病毒被命名为MERS（1）（2），因为它据称起源于中东，最初感染了沙特阿拉伯、约旦和卡塔尔的少数人。随后，英格兰出现了一些病例，其中一些人显然是在前往中东的途中感染的。这种新病毒与SARS相似，但被指控发生了变异，并发展出更有效地入侵人类细胞的能力，因此杀死了约50%的感染者，而SARS仅杀死了约10%。这种病毒是由沙特阿拉伯吉达的一名埃及病毒学家在对一名症状异常的患者进行测试时首次发现的，不久后发现，这位“零号病人”和英国的卡塔尔男子感染了99.5%相同的病毒。（3） 这种疾病没有疫苗或治疗方法，总体死亡率达到40%以上。
South Korea’s President Park Geun-hye postpones US visit over MERS outbreak KIM HONG-JI/REUTERS. Source
韩国总统朴槿惠因MERS疫情推迟访美金弘基/路透社消息来源
By early 2013 there had been nearly 100 cases, mostly centered in the Middle East with the others consisting of infected travelers to those regions (4). But two years later, by June of 2015, almost 2,500 cases of MERS had been reported, most of these being in the Middle East with almost the entire remainder being in Korea, apparently centered on the Gyeonggi provincial district. A small number of cases had been reported in about 25 other countries and, while the virus did not appear to spread easily between humans, it produced a fatality rate in some locations of almost 50% of those infected. South Korea eventually experienced almost 200 cases with about 40 deaths. (5) (6)
截至2013年初，已有近100例病例，其中大部分集中在中东，其他病例由前往这些地区的受感染旅客组成（4）。但两年后，截至2015年6月，报告了近2500例MERS病例，其中大部分在中东，其余几乎全部在韩国，显然集中在京畿道。大约25个其他国家也报告了少量病例，尽管这种病毒似乎不容易在人与人之间传播，但在一些地区，它的死亡率几乎为感染者的50%。韩国最终出现了近200例病例，约40人死亡。(5) (6)
The outbreak in Korea was the largest manifestation of MERS outside the Middle East, hitting this country quite hard. The public were of course worried and anxious, thousands of individuals were in quarantine, thousands of schools were closed, mostly in Seoul and surrounding Gyeonggi Province, airline flights to and from Korea had been reduced by about 50%, and tourism and travel had been sharply curtailed. A number of countries issued travel advisories, and Korea ordered the screening of all inbound passengers, dealing further damage to tourism and business travel. The effect on South Korea’s economy was quite serious, with most observers expecting the economic damage to be in the billions. Cinemas, supermarket chains, shopping malls and theme parks suffered huge drops in attendance and sales, as did most tourist-related facilities including hotels and restaurants.
韩国的疫情是中东以外MERS的最大表现，对该国的打击相当严重。公众当然感到担忧和焦虑，数千人被隔离，数千所学校关闭，其中大部分位于首尔和京畿道周边地区，往返韩国的航空航班减少了约50%，旅游和旅行也大幅减少。一些国家发布了旅行建议，韩国下令对所有入境乘客进行筛查，这对旅游业和商务旅行造成了进一步的损害。这对韩国经济的影响相当严重，大多数观察家预计经济损失将达到数十亿美元。电影院、连锁超市、购物中心和主题公园的上座率和销售额都大幅下降，包括酒店和餐馆在内的大多数旅游相关设施也是如此。
The virus appearing to spread virulently and aggressively in a hospital environment.
这种病毒似乎在医院环境中以病毒性和攻击性的方式传播。
According to the official narrative in the Western media, South Korea’s infections were apparently all traced to a patient zero who developed MERS after returning from a trip to the Middle East and who came into contact with others before being diagnosed. All subsequent infections occurred in Korea’s health facilities, the virus appearing to spread virulently and aggressively in a hospital environment, much the same as the SARS virus did in the Prince of Wales Hospital in Hong Kong, where one patient immediately infected more than 100 medical staff. Apparently about 50% of those with patient contact at the Samsung Medical Centre in Seoul contracted the disease.
根据西方媒体的官方说法，韩国的感染显然都与一名零号患者有关，该患者从中东旅行回来后患上了MERS，并在确诊前与他人接触。随后的所有感染都发生在韩国的卫生设施中，该病毒似乎在医院环境中以病毒性和攻击性传播，与香港威尔士亲王医院的SARS病毒非常相似，在那里，一名患者立即感染了100多名医护人员。显然，在首尔三星医疗中心与患者接触的患者中，约有50%感染了这种疾病。
Margaret Chan and Keiji Fukuda. Source
陈冯富珍和福田敬二。来源
The astonishing spread of MERS inside several Korean hospitals invoked images of Margaret Chan stubbornly opposing hospital redesign in Hong Kong during the SARS outbreak there. As many observers noted, “the hard-learned lessons from the SARS pandemic in Hong Kong apparently never reached Seoul or Geneva”. WHO Assistant Director-General Keiji Fukuda, in an attempted explanation of the virus’ rapid progress in Korean hospitals, stated that “Infection prevention and control measures were not optimal” in Korean hospitals, with overcrowding and patients sharing rooms. He also mentioned the South Koreans’ habit of visiting several medical facilities and the “Korean custom” of patients having many visitors. (7) (8) His comments may have been true, but there was no evidence Saudi Arabia’s control measures were any more optimal than those in Seoul, and Korea is not the only country where hospital patients have contact with visitors or medical staff.
MERS在几家韩国医院内的惊人传播，让人想起了在SARS爆发期间，陈冯富珍顽固反对香港医院重新设计的画面。正如许多观察人士指出的那样，“香港SARS疫情的来之不易的教训显然从未到达首尔或日内瓦”。世界卫生组织助理总干事福田敬二（Keiji Fukuda）试图解释该病毒在韩国医院的快速发展，他表示，韩国医院“感染预防和控制措施不是最佳的”，医院人满为患，患者共享房间。他还提到了韩国人参观多个医疗设施的习惯，以及病人来访人数众多的“韩国习俗”。（7） （8）他的评论可能是真的，但没有证据表明沙特阿拉伯的控制措施比首尔的控制措施更为优化，韩国并不是唯一一个医院患者与访客或医护人员接触的国家。
Oddly, the WHO appeared quite unconcerned about this new potential epidemic, specifically stating it did not recommend the screening of passengers to or from Korea, and that no travel restrictions should be imposed. The WHO’s Director-General, Margaret Chan, said she believed South Korea could control the spread of the disease without these restrictions. One would have thought that with the worldwide panic still fresh in everyone’s mind from the SARS experience only a few years prior, they would have taken a more cautious approach. But then the WHO wasn’t entirely cautious during the SARS outbreak either; in Hong Kong, Margaret Chan specifically advised against taking many precautions, including screenings, isolations and quarantines, all advice that was later much resented because those precautions would have spared many lives. In fact, it was Margaret Chan’s curious combination of aloofness and what appeared to be outright incompetence that resulted in two politicians resigning (9) (10) and her leaving Hong Kong in disgrace, only to come to rest as head of the WHO.
奇怪的是，世界卫生组织似乎对这一新的潜在流行病漠不关心，特别表示不建议对往返韩国的乘客进行筛查，也不应实施旅行限制。世界卫生组织总干事陈冯富珍表示，她相信韩国可以在没有这些限制的情况下控制疾病的传播。人们可能会认为，由于几年前SARS经历的全球恐慌仍历历在目，他们会采取更谨慎的做法。但世界卫生组织在SARS爆发期间也没有完全谨慎；在香港，陈冯富珍特别建议不要采取许多预防措施，包括筛查、隔离和隔离，所有这些建议后来都遭到了强烈不满，因为这些预防措施本可以挽救许多人的生命。事实上，正是陈冯富珍的冷漠和看似完全无能的奇怪结合导致了两位政客辞职（9）（10），她耻辱地离开香港，最终以世界卫生组织负责人的身份落脚。
While the school boards in Seoul and surrounding Gyeonggi Province announced the extension of existing school closures and recommended the temporary closure of many more, on June 11 of 2015 the WHO advised the country to re-open all of them, stating that “Schools had not been linked to the transmission of the virus in Korea or elsewhere”. The WHO also recommended again that Korea lift all travel restrictions, but then suddenly three days later, a team of WHO “experts” surprisingly stated that “The deadly MERS outbreak in South Korea” was “large and complex”, and that “more cases should be anticipated”.And in fact the disease had been spreading at an increasingly rapid pace, with 150 confirmed infections in less than one month. And suddenly, in defiance of Margaret Chan’s “I eat chicken every day” SARS reassurances, the WHO surprisingly stated the Korean government “should remain vigilant” and should continue “intensified disease surveillance and prevention measures”, praising the country for its “strong quarantine measures”. (11) (12)
虽然首尔和周边京畿道的学校董事会宣布延长现有的学校关闭时间，并建议暂时关闭更多学校，但2015年6月11日，世界卫生组织建议该国重新开放所有学校，并表示“学校与病毒在韩国或其他地方的传播无关”。世界卫生组织还再次建议韩国取消所有旅行限制，但三天后突然，世界卫生组织的一个“专家”小组出人意料地表示，“韩国致命的MERS疫情”“规模巨大且复杂”，“应该预计会有更多病例”。事实上，这种疾病的传播速度越来越快，在不到一个月的时间里就有150例确诊感染。突然间，世界卫生组织不顾陈冯富珍“我每天都吃鸡肉”的SARS保证，出人意料地表示，韩国政府“应该保持警惕”，应该继续“加强疾病监测和预防措施”，并赞扬该国的“强有力的隔离措施”。(11) (12)
Interestingly, there was rather sparse coverage of MERS in the Middle East and South Korea, certainly compared to SARS in Hong Kong and Mainland China, and no mention of Saudi Arabia, South Korea, or the WHO delaying, covering up, denying infections and fatality rates, while for Mainland China with SARS we were treated to virulent China-bashing 24/7 for most of a year.Saudi Arabia was heavily criticised internally for its flawed response (13) (14), and the doctor who reported the first MERS patient to the government, was sworn to silence then promptly fired, which rated little mention in the Western media. Soon after, when the outbreak became public, the Saudi Health Minister was also fired. (15) (16)
有趣的是，中东和韩国对MERS的报道相当少，当然与香港和中国大陆的SARS相比，也没有提到沙特阿拉伯、韩国或世界卫生组织推迟、掩盖、否认感染率和死亡率，而对于患有SARS的中国大陆，我们在一年的大部分时间里都接受了致命的中国式流感治疗。沙特阿拉伯因其有缺陷的反应而受到内部的严厉批评（13）（14），向政府报告首例MERS患者的医生发誓要保持沉默，然后立即被解雇，西方媒体对此只字未提。不久之后，当疫情公开后，沙特卫生部长也被解雇了。(15) (16)
There was some muted coverage of the virus, but no clamor for investigation of the source, no genuine search for a patient zero, nor any puzzlement about how a never-before-seen bat-cum-camel virus suddenly appeared, and with a strange preference (and appetite) for residents of the Middle East. Nor could I find any studies of genome sequencing that would have identified the various strains of MERS that infected the Middle East and South Korea. Given the minor rates of infections and fatalities in the rest of the world, this appeared more than curious. Also, any suggestion (and there were suggestions) by scientists of MERS perhaps having had a human black hand, were considered verboten by the Western media, and squashed. There were reports of various teams, including one from Canada (17), who traveled to Saudi Arabia to study the spread of MERS, but no discoveries were publicised. Overall, MERS simply died a quiet death.
对该病毒的报道有些低调，但没有要求调查来源的呼声，也没有真正寻找零号病人，也没有对一种从未见过的蝙蝠兼骆驼病毒是如何突然出现的感到困惑，而且对中东居民有着奇怪的偏好（和食欲）。我也找不到任何基因组测序研究来确定感染中东和韩国的各种MERS毒株。考虑到世界其他地区的感染率和死亡率很低，这似乎非常奇怪。此外，科学家们提出的任何可能有人类黑手的MERS建议（也有一些建议）都被西方媒体认为是被禁止的，并被压制了。有多个团队的报告，包括一个来自加拿大的团队（17人），他们前往沙特阿拉伯研究MERS的传播，但没有公布任何发现。总体而言，MERS只是悄无声息地死去。
Researchers Scramble to Understand Camel Connection to MERS. Source
研究人员争相了解骆驼与MERS的联系。来源
As with SARS, and with COVID-19, the Western media staked out the claim of MERS being (in this case) a ‘camel virus’ which camels, after millennia of friendly cohabitation with man, suddenly decided to share their virology with humans. What is needed is an explanation of the actual source of the new virus in terms of its first human infection. To my knowledge, this was never done, nor was any search for a ‘patient zero’ ever conducted. Instead, the first victim diagnosed was designated as patient zero and the matter dropped. This in itself is bizarre, since normally an extensive and vigorous search is made for this individual. I have no explanation for virologists casually identifying a ‘possible’ original animal source, then ceasing further investigation.
与SARS和新冠肺炎一样，西方媒体声称MERS（在这种情况下）是一种“骆驼病毒”，骆驼在与人类友好共处数千年后，突然决定与人类分享它们的病毒学。我们需要的是从第一次人类感染的角度来解释这种新病毒的实际来源。据我所知，这从未进行过，也从未进行过任何“零号病人”的搜索。相反，第一个被确诊的受害者被指定为零号病人，事情就此平息。这本身就很奇怪，因为通常会对这个人进行广泛而有力的搜索。对于病毒学家随意确定“可能”的原始动物来源，然后停止进一步调查，我没有任何解释。
Yoichi Shimatsu.Source
岛津洋一。来源
But there was more. I have not managed to independently confirm all of these details, but in June of 2015 Yoichi Shimatsu wrote a quite interesting and detailed article (18) (19) that provided a few enlightening additions to the facts of the MERS outbreak in Korea. For one, he reiterated that, according to the Korean Yonhap News Service, at the onset of the outbreak, 100 South Korean military personnel were quarantined at the USAF Osan Air Base, following the MERS infection of servicemen, indicating that this Korean soldier may well have been the actual Patient Zero. For those unfamiliar with the geography of South Korea, both Seoul, which suffered the bulk of the MERS cases, and the USAF base at Osan, are both in close proximity in Gyeonggi Province, which was also reported as the home of the (undocumented and quite likely imaginary) “infected businessman” who traveled to the Middle East and contracted the virus. According to Shimatsu, the Osan base is home to the Joint US Forces-Korea Portal and Integrated Threat Recognition advanced technology demonstration (JUPITR ATD), a military biological surveillance program that operates its other lab facility at Fort Detrick, MD. It is also reportedly the home of one of the US military’s bio-weapons research labs.
但还有更多。我未能独立证实所有这些细节，但岛津洋一在2015年6月写了一篇非常有趣和详细的文章（18）（19），为韩国爆发MERS的事实提供了一些启发性的补充。首先，他重申，据韩国联合通讯社报道，在疫情爆发时，在军人感染MERS后，100名韩国军人在美国空军奥山空军基地被隔离，这表明这名韩国士兵很可能就是真正的零号病人。对于那些不熟悉韩国地理的人来说，MERS病例最多的首尔和位于奥山的美国空军基地都离京畿道很近，据报道，该省也是前往中东并感染病毒的“受感染商人”（无证且很可能是虚构的）的家。据岛津介绍，奥山基地是美军-韩国联合门户网站和综合威胁识别先进技术演示（JUPITR ATD）的所在地，这是一个军事生物监视项目，在马里兰州德特里克堡运营其另一个实验室设施。据报道，该基地也是美军一个生物武器研究实验室的所在地。
Jerome Kim. Source
金。来源
Shimatsu also noted that the WHO sponsors the secretive International Vaccine Institute (IVI) in Seoul, which is headed by a US military officer named Jerome Kim who was formerly the head of the Molecular Virology and Pathogenesis Department at the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research in Rockville, Maryland,and that sitting on the Board of Directors of this WHO-IVI chimera is a Dr. Claudio Lanata, the science director of the US Naval “Medical Research Unit 6” in Callao, Peru, which is a leading military center for bioweapons research. It appears that the US military controls the WHO’s main virus laboratory . . . Shimatsu theorised that the MERS outbreak may have been caused by a laboratory accident at the JUPITR biowarfare project which is located very near Seoul. He also quoted the American Forces Press Service as the source of the information that it was a US biological warfare team that deciphered the MERS genetic code, and that this work was supervised by the Pentagon’s top biowarfare laboratory, its Biological Defense Research Directorate at Fort Detrick, Maryland. Certainly there have been numerous independent suggestions that the WHO at least on occasion appears to function as an appendage of the Pentagon.
Shimatsu还指出，世界卫生组织赞助了位于首尔的秘密国际疫苗研究所（IVI），该研究所由一位名叫Jerome Kim的美国军官领导，他曾是马里兰州洛克维尔沃尔特·里德陆军研究所分子病毒学和发病学系主任。看来美国军方控制着世界卫生组织的主要病毒实验室。Shimatsu认为，MERS的爆发可能是由位于首尔附近的JUPITR生物战项目的实验室事故引起的。他还援引美国部队新闻社的消息来源称，是一个美国生物战小组破译了MERS基因密码，这项工作由五角大楼的顶级生物战实验室，即位于马里兰州德特里克堡的生物防御研究局监督。当然，有许多独立的建议认为，世界卫生组织至少有时似乎是五角大楼的附属机构。
Dr. Claudio Lanata. Source
克劳迪奥·拉纳塔博士。来源
In a thesis on Biological Weapons, Leonard Horowitz and Zygmunt Dembek stated that clear signs of a genetically-engineered bio-warfare agent were (a) a disease caused by an uncommon (unusual, rare, or unique) agent, with (b) lack of an epidemiological explanation, i.e. no clear
idea of source; (c) An “unusual manifestation and/or geographicdistribution”, such as race-specificity; and (d) multiple sources of infection. MERS appeared to satisfy all four criteria. (20)
Leonard Horowitz和Zygmunt Dembek在一篇关于生物武器的论文中指出，基因工程生物战剂的明显迹象是：（a）由一种不常见（不寻常、罕见或独特）的战剂引起的疾病，（b）缺乏流行病学解释，即不清楚
来源；（c） “不寻常的表现和/或地理分布”，如种族特异性；以及（d）多种感染源。MERS似乎满足所有四个标准。（20）
I don’t know what conclusions we draw from this assemblage of information, but it appears at least possible there is rather more to this MERS story than the official narrative propagated in the media. One aspect is that MERS fits all the criteria for a biological weapon, and the fact of the explosive outbreak at the US military’s Osan Airbase is not inconsequential. Thus, MERS also qualifies for a forensic investigation as to the source.
我不知道我们从这些信息中得出了什么结论，但至少有可能这个MERS的故事比媒体上传播的官方说法要多。一个方面是，MERS符合生物武器的所有标准，美军奥桑空军基地爆发爆炸性疫情的事实并非无关紧要。因此，MERS也有资格对来源进行法医调查。
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Mr. Romanoff’s writing has been translated into 32 languages and his articles posted on more than 150 foreign-language news and politics websites in more than 30 countries, as well as more than 100 English language platforms. Larry Romanoff is a retired management consultant and businessman. He has held senior executive positions in international consulting firms, and owned an international import-export business. He has been a visiting professor at Shanghai’s Fudan University, presenting case studies in international affairs to senior EMBA classes. Mr. Romanoff lives in Shanghai and is currently writing a series of ten books generally related to China and the West. He is one of the contributing authors to Cynthia McKinney’s new anthology ‘When China Sneezes’. (Chap. 2 — Dealing with Demons).
罗曼诺夫的作品已被翻译成32种语言，他的文章发表在30多个国家的150多个外语新闻和政治网站以及100多个英语平台上。拉里·罗曼诺夫是一位退休的管理顾问和商人。他曾在国际咨询公司担任高级管理职务，并拥有一家国际进出口公司。他曾是上海复旦大学的客座教授，为高级EMBA课程讲授国际事务案例研究。罗曼诺夫先生居住在上海，目前正在写一系列十本与中国和西方有关的书。他是辛西娅·麦金尼新选集《当中国打喷嚏》的特约作者之一。（第二章——对付魔鬼）。
His full archive can be seen at
他的完整档案可以在
https://www.bluemoonofshanghai.com/ + https://www.moonofshanghai.com/
He can be contacted at:
可以通过以下方式联系他：
2186604556@qq.com
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注释 — Notes
(1) https://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/health-and-families/health-news/ten-years-after-sars-now-we-have-mers-8640817.html ;the original link is no longer active.
(2) https://www.theguardian.com/science/2013/mar/15/coronavirus-next-global-pandemic
(3) http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/hkedition/2012-10/10/content_15805337.htm
(4) https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4622265/
(5) https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/28153558
(6) South Korea president postpones visit to US as 2 more die from MERS; Shanghai Daily | June 11, 2015;
（6） 韩国总统推迟访美，又有2人死于MERS；上海日报| 2015年6月11日；
(7) https://www.nytimes.com/video/world/asia/100000003730450/who-to-look-into-mers-in-south-kore.html
(8) https://www.who.int/ihr/procedures/MERS_Fukuda_PC_20130705.pdf
(9) https://www.bmj.com/content/329/7458/130.2
(10) https://www.scmp.com/article/462297/dedicated-yeoh-quits-over-sars
(11) https://www.cnbc.com/2015/06/13/south-koreas-mers-outbreak-large-and-complex-who.html
(13) http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/6/3/saudi-raises-mersdeathtollandcases.html
(15) https://www.cbc.ca/news/health/amid-mers-deaths-saudi-health-minister-fired-1.2616520
(16) https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/22/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-health-official-fired.html
(17) https://www.cbc.ca/news/health/who-team-including-canadian-investigates-how-mers-spreads-1.1389628
(18) (Shimatsu is a free-lance journalist based in Hong Kong, a former Editor of the Japan Times Weekly and a former Tsinghua University lecturer).
（18） （岛津是香港的自由职业记者，曾任《日本时代周刊》编辑和清华大学讲师）。https://rense.com/general96/merspenta.html
(19) https://www.21cir.com/2015/06/south-korea-mers-emerged-out-of-the-pentagons-biowarfare-labs-2/
(20) Medical Aspects of Biological Warfare; https://repository.netecweb.org/items/show/325
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Copyright © Larry Romanoff, Blue Moon of Shanghai, Moon of Shanghai, 2024
版权所有©Larry Romanoff，上海蓝月亮，上海月亮，2024
Biological Warfare in Action, CHAPTER 13, CHINESE, LARRY ROMANOFF, US NATO War Agenda
